Understanding the review you are now reading engages knowledge of three kinds: you have knowledge of the physical world (perception of the visual patterns that constitute the text of the review), knowledge of another person's mind (that aspect of the author's mind communicated here through written language), and knowledge of your own mind (you have your beliefs and opinions about the piece). Cognitive neuroscience underwrites the conviction that it is your brain that is mediating all three aspects of knowing about the world; the challenge is to explain how the brain does it. We know that our beliefs about the world are often mistaken and that even our beliefs about ourselves are subject to revision. So how is it that we seem to mostly get it right?
In his new book entitled Making Up the Mind, Chris Frith provides a highly accessible and easy to read overview of the way in which the brain mediates knowledge about the physical and social world. His basic answer to the question of how the brain does it is familiar (brains construct models of the world), but his perspective distinguishes this book from many other popular books that describe the relation between mind and brain. Frith is careful to note that he is not out to explain conscious experience or to solve the mind-body problem. He emphasizes that brains are fundamentally adapted not merely to construct models based on sensory information, but to act on the world and to predict the consequences of those actions. This emphasis might be expected for those familiar with Frith's own work, which has been at the forefront of neuroscience studies in agency and social interaction.
Frith is Professor of Neuropsychology at the Wellcome Trust Center for Neuroimaging at University College London, one of the foremost neuroimaging centers in the world. Together with his wife Uta and many distinguished students, he has conducted seminal studies of how our sense of will and agency depend on particular brain structures; more recently these studies have been extended into studies of imitation, empathy, and social cooperativity. If you ask him, he may confide to you that he intends to ''retire'' very soon, which for him means shifting energy from experiments to writing books. The present one can thus be seen as the first installment in a series of volumes we might expect, and it provides glimpses of directions to be taken in his future writings.
One attitude toward our leading question, how the brain manages to generate mostly true beliefs about the world, is to doubt that it does so. Philosophers have long debated the faith we can put in our apparent knowledge of the world, but many of them have meanwhile joined laypeople in taking our patent adaptive behavior as evidence that, in fact, we do mostly get things right. Frith's book follows a similar course from initial doubt about our experience of the world to a very lucid introduction to the mechanisms that assure that our mind's model of the world coincides with reality in some sense.
The book is structured in three parts, each containing chapters that have brief summaries at the end. The first part describes how the brain creates our perception of the physical world, and how this can break down following neurological or psychiatric disease. There will be little new here for cognitive neuroscientists, but it is entertaining to read and an excellent introduction for the general reader. The entire first three chapters of the book are concerned with pointing out our indirect and often erroneous knowledge of the world. There are numerous examples from patients with specific neurological injuries that show there can be evidence for knowledge about the world from a person's actions even when they are unaware of that knowledge. There are more pathological cases yet, of course, where there is not just a lack of conscious access, but a person's beliefs are in fact deluded-hallucinations of various kinds fall into this category. There are also examples from normal perception, such as change blindness, a phenomenon where we fail to notice an often large change in a visual scene because we fail to pay attention to it; in a sense, we see the change, but we cannot report it because it is not incorporated into our model of the visual scene. This first part of the book concludes by showing us that even knowledge of our own bodies can be mistaken: we simply do not have incorrigible or indubitable access to any aspect of the world.
Part two is perhaps the most developed part of the book, and probably the one most interesting to neuroscientists. It describes how brains predict events in the world, including their own actions and the outcomes of those. This part puts mind and world back together again by explaining how brains can build models of the world that are based on learning and on making errors in such a way that they will generally improve our future expectations of the way the world is. Temporal difference learning and Bayesian updating are explained in a very clear and introductory way. As Frith points out, it is critical that we have expectations, even when they are wrong, because these are the priors on which Bayesian models are based, and the prerequisite for learning from experience. The section concludes with a chapter on how we model the goals and intentions of other people, and throughout there are illustrative examples from research studies, including the author's own.
The third and last section of the book is the shortest and asks how shared experience of the world, and communication about it, can generate social learning and culture. The book concludes with an interesting epilogue in which Frith speculates that aspects of social behavior that may be unique to humans, such as nonreciprocal altruism and altruistic punishment, depend on our sense of agency and on our beliefs that other people are free agents as well.
The three parts of the book, and the short summaries sprinkled at various places throughout them, follow a logical plan. The first few chapters describe how much cognitive processing goes on below the level of conscious awareness and how indirect is the link between the contents of our minds and the world they purport to represent. Part two of the book does most of the work in explaining how we improve our models and how they lead to adaptive behavior with experience and learning. There are numerous descriptions of fascinating neuropsychological cases given throughout, as there are personal and historical vignettes, and Frith's enthusiasm for doing science is apparent on every page. The book is not only easy to read prose in general, but often amusing and entertaining. One device Frith deploys is an imaginary partner in conversation, a professor of English, with whom he argues to set up the questions more clearly. This may strike some readers (and has struck some reviewers) as a bit annoying; but the English professor makes spare appearances, and I found the idea mildly entertaining.
The book is best suited for a general readership interested in cognitive neuroscience, and also for beginning students in the field. One particular strength is its conveyance of the author's passion for doing science and the excitement of the questions. For cognitive neuroscientists and philosophers of mind, the book serves more as a template and advertisement for in-depth treatments that, one hopes, will appear from Frith's pen in the near future. The second section of the book could easily be expanded into a solid cognitive neuroscience volume, much of it describing the author's own work. The third section of the book would make for an exciting more philosophical book on the role of social communication and culture in generating models and knowledge of the world. The author is in a unique position to make a major contribution here, and it is a very timely topic.
There are some perspectives in the book that could also form a basis for fruitful disagreements and debate. There is an emphasis on learning, somewhat marginalizing innate aspects of knowledge. There is also an emphasis on viewing the brain's model of the world as mediating all our knowledge of the world, neglecting the possibility that considerable knowledge may be distributed in a consensual social model (part three of the book hints at this) and that many aspects of knowledge may not be modeled at all, but simply there in the world. Frith acknowledges that our models do not contain all that we can know, as in the phenomenon of change-blindness mentioned earlier, but it is clear that he would not subscribe to any kind of Gibsonian ''direct'' perception and still sees the contents of our experience of the world as that of the brain's models, rather than as of the world itself. None of these issues are ones on which Frith's views are contentious-indeed, his treatment is very balanced, but it does leave room for further discussion and debate about emphasis.
There is a final issue that Frith's book does omit: knowledge of our own minds. The book discusses knowledge of the external world, of other minds, and of our own bodies. But it leaves out a discussion of how we know what goes on in our own minds-how do we know what we think and believe? There are puzzles about this aspect of knowledge, since first-person knowledge patently has a more authoritative status than third-person knowledge. We can agree with Frith that, like for knowledge about the world and other minds, we can be mistaken about knowledge of our own minds; nonetheless, both the way in which we know about the contents of our own minds and the force of what we say about that are unique in many respects. Many other animals know about their physical environment through building models, and in most of them at least some of this knowledge is accompanied by conscious experience of the world. But it seems doubtful that any animal other than Homo sapiens can think about the content of its own mind and has concepts that distinguish objective and subjective. It also remains obscure on the basis of what kind of information or evidence we can construct a model of our own mind, since we typically (unlike our models of other minds) do not base it on behavioral observation. Frith's last chapter motivates some initial ideas for how this might nonetheless be based, at least in part, on behavioral 
